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The rapid development of digital technology infrastructure in the People’s Republic of China 
together with the government’s recent support of grassroots innovation has led to a growing 
mood of techno-nationalism, as well as a feeling that digital technology can play an important 
role in renovating China’s international image. Powerful internet companies are challenging 
the dominance of traditional state-owned media. Cultural products are digitized, distributed 
and consumed on online platforms. Such platforms offer consumers a choice of content 
through subscription, either free or paid. With China’s media and culture striving to ‘go out’ 
(zou chuqu), typified by CCTV and Confucius Institutes, we pose the question: can China use 
the ‘digital power’ of the Internet to achieve international recognition as an ‘innovative 
nation’ or will the internet perpetuate a stereotype of China as a copycat nation?  
 














I like to think 
(it has to be!) 
of a cybernetic ecology 
where we are free of our labors 
and joined back to nature, 
returned to our mammal 
brothers and sisters, 
and all watched over 
by machines of loving grace 
 
All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace, Richard Brautigan 1967 
 
Introduction: Ten Thousand Things 
Strolling the streets of Shenzhen in Southern China, one might come across a government 
propaganda poster proclaiming ‘Chinese people love the ten thousand things’ (Zhongguoren 
ai wanwu 中国人爱万物). A philosophical idea informing Daoist and Confucian thought, 
wanwu (literally ‘the ten thousand things’) signifies endless variety and constant change. 
Placed alongside posters proselytizing the ‘Chinese Dream’, we see an image of a pitiable-
looking person amid some small animals (not ‘things’). The interpretation is somewhat 
mystifying, both to Chinese and foreign passers-by.  
From another perspective, wanwu extols the success of Shenzhen’s digital industries. 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is sometimes translated as wanwu hulianwang (万物互联网);1 
that is, a network of myriad connected ‘things’ – and potentially many thousands of people. 
The Internet of Things points to a cybernetic future in which big data, sensors, and smart 
devices will liberate people, making us more productive. The global production centre for 
‘things’ associated with the IoT is Shenzhen. Shenzhen is home to the Chinese technology 
giant, Tencent Holdings Ltd. On 27 August 2015, a report in the South China Morning Post 
proclaimed that WeChat, Tencent’s popular mobile messaging app, was driving interest in the 
IoT through its open hardware platform (He 2015). Thanks to ubiquitous technology, low-
cost sensors, and easy-to-deploy microelectronics, it is possible to connect ‘just about 
                                               




anything and everything to the internet’ (Greengard 2015: 57). While Shenzhen is the 
epicentre of the IoT, developments elsewhere in China are elevating China’s technological 
capabilities, engendering innovation, and attracting interest from global venture capital.   
In this paper, we offer the following speculative question: Can China use the ‘digital 
power’ of the internet to achieve international recognition as an innovative nation, or will the 
internet perpetuate a stereotype of China as a copycat nation? Our purpose is not to provide a 
definitive answer; rather, it is to focus on strategies to enhance the nation’s ‘cultural power’ 
(wenhua qiangguo 文化强国) and, in doing so, its international reputation. China’s digital 
media industries are commercial, many are IPO (Initial Public Offering) listed entities. At the 
same time, they are bound to the government’s national development blueprints; in the field 
of media and technology these are ‘the innovative nation’ (chuangxin xing guojia 创新型国
家) and, more specifically, Internet+ (discussed below). The ‘innovation nation’, and the 
techno-utopianism now associated with the Chinese Dream, are tied to China’s development 
agenda, laid out in the 13th Five Year Economic Plan (cf. Xinhua 2016). 
The question of Chinese innovation conjures up various associations. The view in the 
international community wavers somewhere between suspicion of intellectual property 
violation and respect for local inventiveness. Following the work of the political scientist 
David Shambaugh (2013), we deconstruct the concept of global presence. We argue that 
while China has achieved a global presence – for instance, people everywhere are aware of 
the ubiquity of made-in-China goods – the idea of China as a centre of innovation has not 
garnered global recognition: this is despite hyperbolic reports that indicate a shift of global 
power (cf. Yip & McKern 2016; Erisman 2015). Chinese media, likewise, are viewed in the 
global mirror as derivative and propagandist, comparing unfavourably with the ‘cool’, often 
highly original pop culture of South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan.  
The advent of media platforms and services linking Chinese culture and Chinese 
worldviews with communities around the globe heralds a new dawn of enhanced 
connectivity, which we will call ‘digital China’. Such an upgrading of digital infrastructure is 
reflected in cyber-nationalism (Jiang 2012) and techno-utopianism (Lindtner 2015). In this 
paper, we examine the association between techno-utopianism and political statecraft, 
particularly the government’s prescription of a cybernetic future in which ordinary people 
will become ‘mass entrepreneurs’ (for a critique see Lindtner 2015; Wang 2016). In 
recalibrating the capacity of China’s media and communications industries to ‘go out’, we are 




commercial online platforms can provide a barometer to assess China’s influence outside its 
national borders. Our attention is on internet industry ‘giants’ such as Baidu, Alibaba, and 
Tencent, known collectively as BAT.  
In our discussion, we characterize the emerging digital ecology in China as a shift 
from ‘state culture’ (a closed system) to ‘services’ (an open system) to ‘knowledge’ (a 
complex ecosystem). We begin, however, with a brief overview of scholarship on the 
internet, identifying a ‘perception’ of bias, or at least differing approaches to evaluating 
knowledge in the Western academy and in the PRC. Scholarship conducted outside China is 
weighted towards online activism (see Yang 2009). There are good reasons for this, not least 
a strong tradition of critique in the Western academy. However, the internet has many 
manifestations that can be investigated, including its potential to impact on the workforce, to 
benefit elderly and marginalized communities, to engender grassroots innovation, and to 
provide a new distribution channel for traditional cultural products. Our intention in this 
article, therefore, is to signal a broader pathway for research, one that shows how the internet 
is transforming China, both within its borders, and in the world outside China’s borders.  
The next section examines how the internet is enabling the dissemination of culture 
and, by extension, soft power (Nye 1990). Soft power is arguably an overused concept: it 
refers to the attractiveness of a nation’s culture and values – the ability to ‘attract’ followers 
rather than using force (hard power). We introduce the concept of ‘presence’ as a proxy for 
soft power, noting how China’s ‘cultural presence’ is remediated in real time through online 
communication, rather than via conventional soft power strategies, for instance overseas 
delegations, performances, and festivals.  
The next two sections of the paper address the evolving ecosystem of digital 
innovation in China. We begin with a discussion of three interdependent layers of activity, 
which are constantly in tension: ‘official carriers’ (government media institutions), ‘digital 
platforms’ (commercial media), and ‘users’ (consumers/ audiences). The following section 
introduces the above-mentioned digital ecology framework, which we characterize as 
‘culture-services-knowledge’, a heuristic developed by Stuart Cunningham (2005) to describe 
the migration of content onto digital platforms, transfers of cross-platform expertise, and the 
implications for media regulation. We hope that by applying this model to China we will 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of media industry convergence on the Mainland, 
which calls to mind Louis Mumford’s ‘will to utopia’ (Mumford 2003/1922) as much as a 
will to ‘cultural power’. The paper concludes with a provisional assessment of China’s 





Scholarship on the Internet: Balancing a Western Bias 
Much territory is currently uncharted with respect to the Chinese government’s deployment 
of internet technologies. To date, the bulk of academic research has focused on the internet 
within China. Research has investigated political control, online activism, and ‘cultures of 
contention’ (Yang 2009). In saying this, we need to ask: is there a bias in Western research – 
or does Chinese research navigate a narrow political road? Perhaps a more appropriate 
question is: what do we actually mean by the Chinese internet? For over two decades, 
researchers have focused on political, economic, and social impacts in and on China (Herold 
& De Seta 2015: 73–74). While we do not intend to provide a comprehensive listing of 
literature, it is clear where the English language balance lies. Studies have had two basic foci: 
the internet and the democratization of China; and the internet as a means of entry for 
Western corporations into the large Chinese market.  
The former, representing the dominant approach, both in terms of numbers and 
citations, views the internet as a site of contestation. This is represented in critiques of socio-
cultural space (Lei 2011; Lu & Qiu 2013; Yang 2009; 2014; Yu 2006; Stockmann 2015; 
Wang 2015); control and surveillance (Bamman, O’Connor, & Smith 2012; Taubman 1998; 
Chen 2015), e-governance (Schlæger 2015: Schlæger & Jiang 2015; Balla 2015) as well as 
the identification of digital, rural, local, and urban divides (Jung et al. 2001; Qiu 2009; Weber 
2011; Szablewicz 2015). On the other hand, the business focus is on legal and regulatory 
issues such as intellectual property, consumer rights protection, and online user experience 
(examples include Cheung 2016, 2012; Montgomery & Priest 2016; Keane & Zhao 2012; 
Gao, Waechter, & Bai 2015; Liu, Y. 2015).  
In order to draw a comparison of research themes, we conducted a search on the 
Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI) using the specific search criteria: 
title=Internet: time=2014 – 10 August 2016. The results showed 2225 records: 2014 (482), 
2015 (1004) and 2016 (740).2 Research within the PRC is broadly organized into four 
clusters. The first cluster concerns BAT, the collective term now used to describe the three 
largest internet technology players, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. As we discuss below, these 
three companies with their combined assets and resources effectively run the commercial 
                                               





internet in China. Citations counts in this cluster list ‘Internet+’3 (342), the ‘mobile internet’ 
(116), ‘internet thinking’ (85), and ‘big data’ (68), and topics range from finance to film 
production, especially with BAT active in the film production sphere. The second cluster 
examines development trends and governance regulations pertaining to the internet finance 
ecosystem. According to Chen & Tan (2016), more than 270,000 papers had been authored 
on internet finance by the end of 2015. Prominent citations here are ‘internet finance’ (341) 
and ‘third party payments’ (47). The third cluster concerns Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOC) operated by the top universities across a range of subject areas with citations in 
‘social media’. The fourth category is a general discussion of the internet and citations mainly 
address ‘internet economy’ (46) and the Internet of Things (42).     
From the abovementioned comparison of literature and citations, it is clear the 
research focus is overwhelmingly about the internet in China – and in the case of Chinese 
research, the architecture of the internet. In contrast to research conducted outside China, 
there is a deficit of research within China on social activism. This is hardly surprising. 
Research conducted on China in liberal democracies privileges resistance to power and draws 
heavily on theorists writing about pluralist societies. Transplanting across social and political 
contexts, for instance, Foucauldian notions of power (cf. Jiang 2012), often leads to 
predetermined analytical outcomes, for instance, that China is irrevocably drawn into a 
neoliberal world order. In fact, the obverse is the case, much of the world is influenced 
directly or indirectly4 by the ‘China model’ of state capitalism. In this paper, we draw ideas 
from a broad range of scholarship in order to contribute to a middle-range theoretical 
approach.5  
The overriding image from the international research literature is that China is 
changing slowly, aside from its restless digital communities. Yet, anyone who has spent time 
in China knows that it is probably the most successful nation state in the world in terms of its 
ability to adapt. In their state-of-the-field stocktake, Herold & De Seta (2015: 79) note that 
very few studies have looked at ‘how China shapes the Internet.’ We believe there are two 
                                               
3 The government’s internet blueprint; see discussion in the following section.  
4 In the developed world, the Chinese approach to sovereignty, including internet sovereignty, is influential. 
Much of this ‘soft power’ is led by Chinese business going out; in particular, the One Belt One Road Policy is 
opening Eurasia to Chinese notions of economic and social progress. 
5 Middle-range theory is distinctive from ‘grand theory’: like its name, it attempts to broker a middle way 
between totalizing explanatory schemes or grand narratives and traditional area studies approaches that require 




reasons for this gap: first, Western scholarly bias towards critique, and second, a lack of 
global presence by China’s internet corporations. However, the second reason no longer 
holds true, as the Chinese research citations attest. Alibaba’s success as the world’s largest 
IPO ever represents the first wave in the globalization of China’s internet corporations. When 
China overtook the US in 2014 as the world’s largest economy in purchasing power parity 
terms, its success was partly due to an increasing commitment to the development of 
information communication technology (PwC 2015). Elsewhere, the MIT-based China expert 
Wang Jing (2016) notes a seismic shift from top-down government-managed clusters and 
innovation parks to bottom-up creative maker communities.  
 
Presence Remediated: Digital Culture ‘Going Out’ 
In the first decade of the new millennium, national soft power became a talking point in 
Chinese think tanks. A notable development in China in the early 2000s was the 
appropriation of Nye’s (1990) concept within a policy framework called ‘comprehensive 
national power’ (Hu & Men 2002), which, at the time, aligned with the idea of a ‘rising 
China’. In the years coinciding with the ascendency of the Xi Jinping faction in 2013, a new 
slogan, ‘strong cultural power’ (wenhua qiangguo 文化强国), entered the political lexicon. 
Along with the pre-existing policy of ‘going out’, it identified the need for China to convert 
its economic presence into global cultural dominance, or perhaps to put it more contentiously, 
to assert China’s ‘cultural power’.  
Without doubt, China has established an economic presence in the world in the past 
decades. Made-in-China goods proliferate. Chinese companies have established market 
presence, for instance: Huawei (Huawei Technologies: electronics), Hai’er (Hai’er 
Corporation: white goods), and Lenovo (Legend Holdings Ltd.: computers). Yet, despite 
these outbound achievements, China’s international brand (its reputation) remains 
demonstrably weak. Economic presence does not equate to influence or ‘soft power’ status. 
Internationally, the UK, the US, Japan, and South Korea have garnered reputations as 
creative nations. The Chinese government is envious and has for some time endeavoured to 
make the nation’s culture more globally appealing, its media output more imaginative, and its 
technology more cutting edge. Many strategies currently assist Chinese culture (and 
ideology) to ‘go global’. Government-endorsed cultural representatives – Confucius 
Institutes, China Central Television (CCTV) channels, artists, and performance troupes – 




signs of ascendancy on the global stage outside of overseas Chinese communities. China is a 
‘partial power,’ according to David Shambaugh (2013). Western culture has consolidated its 
influence.  
While the ‘going global’ of China’s media and the quest for soft power may be ‘the 
hottest topic of the day’ (Zhao 2013: 18), research has yet to address the role of China’s new 
‘digital champions’, best represented by Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT), whose CEOs 
proudly self-identify as ‘digital disruptors’. Undoubtedly, ‘digital disruption’ is impacting on 
traditional modes of production and consumption. At the same time, it is challenging the 
Chinese Communist Party to reassess its command and control strategies in the cultural 
sphere. While disruption is a term that one needs to be cautious of when it is promoted by 
companies with strong links to an authoritarian government, already there are signs that a 
new digital Silk Road is allowing Chinese cultural goods and services to make virtual inroads 
into world markets, paralleling the material infrastructure of One Belt One Road. That said, 
we note that the internationalization of China’s digital media empire is just beginning. An 
analysis of China’s ‘overseas deals’ between 2006 and 2016 by Bloomberg (2016) reveals a 
prominent spike in internet and software in the past year. 
The most obvious example is Alibaba’s Taobao (within China) and AliExpress 
(internationally). To this we can add Baidu’s streaming service IQiyi as well as LeTV and 
Youku Tudou, which allow Chinese content to be accessed anywhere in the world in real 
time, even while Google’s YouTube and Facebook are blocked in the Mainland. We might 
even say that digital channels and applications (apps) are changing the ways that Chinese 
culture ‘goes out’. How digital companies such as Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent navigate the 
vagaries of policy while appropriating the creativity of user communities is of great interest 
to scholars as well as foreign governments and businesses looking to develop networks and to 
expand their operations in China.  
As always in China, the context is economic and social development. In the framing 
of the 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016–2020), the Chinese 
leadership has moved its development agenda towards the nation becoming a services-led 
economy. Informatization (xinxi hua 信息化), and the upgrading of digital infrastructure, are 
central to this agenda. As far back as the Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–2005) period, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) articulated China’s National Innovation System 
(NIS) strategy; it greenlighted the construction of science and technology industrial parks, 




Chinese technology graduates working in Silicon Valley to return to China (Wang 2016). In 
2006, China’s State Council launched a mid- to long-term plan (2006–2020) to strengthen 
China’s science and technology (S&T) development. China would become an innovation-
oriented nation (chuangxin xing guojia 创新型国家) by 2020.  
The ‘Outline of the Program for Innovation in National Culture and Technology’ in 
2012 further established the blueprint. In March 2015, the President Xi Jinping-led 
government championed a policy agenda called Internet+, the next stage in a strategy to 
expand informatization and harness the benefits of the knowledge economy. The Internet+ 
strategy offers a big-picture reassessment of digital capabilities. Its objectives are: ‘to 
integrate mobile Internet, cloud computing big data, and the Internet of Things with modern 
manufacturing, to encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, 
and Internet banking, and to get Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the 
international market’ (Li 2015). The plan is even touted as the ‘uberisation of the Chinese 
economy’ (Pasquier 2015). The technological frontier of Internet+ includes next generation 
information networks, core electronics, high-end software and new information services. 
Particularly in coastal cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, the emerging technologies of mobile 
internet, cloud computing, and big data are driving the ‘upgrade’ of cultural and creative 
industries. By endorsing the Internet+ blueprint the government has championed 
‘collaborative innovation’ (xietong chuangxin 协同创新), which entails liberating grassroots 
innovation (Wang 2016). In June 2015, the State Council issued instructions in a document 
entitled ‘Opinions to Further Boost Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ (dazhong chuangye 
wanzhong chuangxin 大众创业万众创新). Among the eight recommendations/opinions were a 
range of policies and fiscal incentives to maximize the development of an ‘entrepreneurial 
ecosystem.’  This is discussed in the following sections. 
 
Official Carriers, Digital Platforms, and Users 
Many studies focus on part of the evolving digital landscape, for instance the involvement of 
‘netizens’ and activists, business leaders, or political institutions. In order to understand how 
the internet functions in China, not just the internet within China, we need to be aware of the 
larger canvas. Of course, our point here is that Chinese servers and websites have an 
international reach; that is, they are not blocked by foreign governments. We identify three 
interrelated domains of content origination, dissemination, reception, and sharing: these are 




Official carriers include government departments and ministries – the primary 
legislators and providers of media infrastructure. While major state media organizations have 
established an online presence as part of government going online, the state’s continued and 
routine interference in content has rendered official channels largely ineffective (Sun 2015: 
409). The term ‘official carriers’ thus reflects the ‘visible hand of government’ (Keane 2015) 
in the form of regulation, subvention, and censorship. The most heavy-handed regulatory 
institutions are the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television (SAPPRFT), and the Central Propaganda Department, sometimes called 
the Publicity Department.  
The state’s involvement in disseminating messages overseas; that is, making China’s 
voice heard in the world, has a long legacy dating back to the Maoist era: it is routinely 
described as external propaganda (wai xuan 外宣). Sending messages overseas is part of 
China’s foreign relations, which has evolved considerably since the 1950s. Florian Schneider 
(2016) writes that attention now is focused on not offending ‘foreign audiences’ with content 
that is too ‘propagandistic.’ The problem is that propaganda (ideology) is never far from the 
surface, even in formatted entertainment programmes like The Brain (Zuiqiang Danao 最强
大脑). State-approved content is dispatched to overseas markets, sometimes facilitated by 
reciprocal business relationships; for example, China Central Television (CCTV) is broadcast 
in multiple languages and accessed on foreign TV networks in exchange for landing rights in 
the PRC. However, despite a massive upscaling in the number of channels, particularly in 
overseas tourist hotels, there is no actual audience research that validates CCTV’s reception 
overseas (see Zhu 2013). What we do know is that overseas Chinese audiences, apart from 
viewing the 7.00 pm national news service, which is distributed by CCTV, are predominantly 
attracted to commercial satellite channels (Sun & Sinclair 2016). At the same time, incoming 
cultural content is strictly regulated by SAPPRFT, forcing foreign players to partner with 
Chinese companies or invest in non-content areas.  
Digital platforms have benefited from the rollout of public communications 
infrastructure. They are represented primarily by Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT), aka the 
‘Three Kingdoms’, a reference to the intense competition in the digital landscape. These 
‘kingdoms’ are acquiring social networking firms, game developers, online video portals, 
logistics, and apps to strengthen their market position and compete with each other for the 
spoils of war (Mian 2015). Comparatively speaking, they exert control over different 




Baidu remains the dominant search engine in China, Alibaba is synonymous with e-
commerce, while Tencent lords over social media. While BAT is an easy acronym to 
remember, there are many other players contending for the spoils of the digital age, some of 
which have been absorbed into BAT war chests; for instance, the online video site Youku 
Tudou is now one-third owned by Alibaba. Tencent Holdings and Sohu meanwhile have 
engaged in protracted merger deliberations since early 2015.        
Chinese communications, technology, and media companies have already ‘gone out’ 
in a number of ways and directions. As early as 2005, Lenovo had bought IBM’s PC division, 
later acquiring Motorola’s smartphone business. By the first half of 2014, the high 
technology sector accounted for 87.5 per cent of Chinese FDI in the US, with several 
companies targeting assets in Silicon Valley. Baidu set up R&D centres in Silicon Valley in 
2014, to add to those in Japan, Brazil, and Thailand (Wang & Miao 2016). Undoubtedly, 
Dalian Wanda’s acquisition of AMC (2014) and Hoyts (2015) cinema chains as well as its 
purchase of Hollywood’s Legendary Pictures in 2016, will provide global outlets for Chinese 
content. Similarly, LeTV’s 2015 partnership with Netflix to reformat the TV drama 
Empresses in the Palace entails a strengthening of commercial strategies abroad. Alibaba’s 
2015 acquisition of the South China Morning Post affords it an influential role in shaping 
international perceptions of China (Barboza 2015), pointing to what many consider the real 
intent of the ‘going out’ campaign, namely, reversing negative reporting of China (Sun 2015; 
Zhao 2013). In 2016, CCTV resold digital streaming rights to the Rio Olympics to Tencent 
and AliSports, the online sports arm of Alibaba, for a fee reported to be RMB 100 million 
(US$15 million) for each (Lee 2016). Chinese audiences globally were able to access the 
Games through these apps.  
The influence of these platforms is disrupting the traditional media, which are having 
to change their strategies. In looking to internationalize, these platforms have government 
support. There is, however, a quid pro quo. The 13th Five Year Plan has made it clear that 
China’s leading internet companies are set to play a key role in providing their ‘open innovation 
resources’ to small- and medium enterprises and entrepreneurial start-ups (cf. Xinhua 2016: ch. 
26), and to facilitate innovation in ‘culture’ through the convergence of technological innovation 
and cultural creativity (Ibid.: ch. 68). In this way, the Chinese government looks to secure the 
services and loyalty of its digital champions. 
Users in China numbered 710  million by June 2016 (CNNIC 2016), in addition to 
many hundreds of millions overseas. As international critique has shown, the Chinese internet 




that manifests among users is based on media events; for instance, parodies, spoofs, and 
critiques of power and corruption. Users are largely ambivalent; they engage with symbolic 
forms and practices; they are often amateur, and they thrive on a culture of contention (Yang 
2009: 7). While some are extremely patriotic, many others are hostile; indeed, many rely on 
their messages ‘going out’ to the world in order to underpin civil society activism (Yang 
2009). Such counter-publics find ways of avoiding censorship, circulating memes, and tales 
of official corruption, often encoded in a distinctive ‘internet language’ that is frequently two 
steps ahead of the regulators. All the same, time patriots patrol the internet, taking down 
offending posts and reposting patriotic messages (Keane, J. 2013).  
The relationship between official carriers and digital platforms, and between 
government and communities, is underpinned by the spectre of ‘internet sovereignty,’ adding 
a layer of ‘structured uncertainty’ (Bresnitz & Murphree 2013) to the activities that are 
allowable and encouraged. If digital platforms act overtly as carriers of propaganda or 
emissaries of the state, they will jeopardize profitability; and if they follow a purely 
commercial route (by encouraging contention) they will attract conflict from regulators. 
While they may be lauded as digital champions, the reputation of these companies in China is 




Online media, big data, a plethora of apps, devices, and affordances, are changing the way 
people everywhere connect with and consume culture. In addition, the ‘cloud’, a distributed 
system of computer resources, millions of servers, hard drives, routers, fibre-optic cables, and 
networks that connect masses of people (Hu 2015), has resulted in an unprecedented 
repository of personal data. On a positive note, digital technology is providing new 
opportunities for ‘vernacular’ (Burgess 2006), amateur (Leadbeater & Miller 2004), and 
grassroots creativity (Voci 2010). The digital environment impacts on how artists and 
‘culture-makers’ express themselves. Burri-Nenova (2008: 17) writes, ‘everything is online 
and some things are only online.’ Consider, for instance, the process of cultural production: a 
film producer secures a script, finds a director, actors, film crew, technical support, and 
financers; the output is then digitalized; the rights are sold to online platforms whereby the 
film is streamed or downloaded on-demand. At the same time, the consumption of the 
product online leaves a digital fingerprint that is of value to advertisers and associated third 




How, then, can we make sense of China’s convergent media space? In 2005, Stuart 
Cunningham described ‘three grids of understanding -- “culture”, “services”, and 
“knowledge’” (Cunningham 2005, 200) to explain changes wrought by convergence on 
‘cultural policy fundamentals’. The context was an increasing trend towards transmedia and 
the monetizing of digitally-enabled user-generated content. As mentioned above, material 
culture (the book, the movie, the TV serial) is digitized, downloaded, and streamed on 
demand (services), and this affects a digital trace (knowledge, big data). This trajectory has 
accelerated. The convergent media environment is nowhere more evident than in China, as 
shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1: The CSK ecology of cultural production and digital consumption in China 
 Culture (closed 
system) 






e.g. CCTV ‘going 
out’. 
Regulatory policies and 
institutions to support 












Content production,   
distribution  
(digital and material  
culture) to overseas  
consumers 
e-commerce / social 
networks / search 
engines /  
multimedia streaming; 
acquisition of 




Cloud computing / big  
data analytics / 
algorithms and artificial 
intelligence; market 
intelligence; applications 
in non-cultural domains 
(e.g. health, education, 
finance, population 
management) 
Users Amateur, artistic, 
and smaller scale 
production / cultures 





fan communities, user 
generated content 
Online sharing  
Communities / hacker 





Culture is clearly politicized in the PRC, and has been for over two thousand years since the 
Confucian rectification of names. While popular culture globally is dynamic (see Groys 
2014), in modern China official culture has effectively functioned as a ‘closed system’: 




statecraft. In the Maoist era, all cultural workers were designated as government employees; 
culture was the superstructure, and the economy the material base. The reforms initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping moved culture towards the economy / base. Culture was something to be 
‘developed’, but according to certain guiding principles. Foreign investment was off limits. 
From the late 1990s, cultural development (wenhua jianshe 文化建设) exercised the minds of 
policymakers at all levels of government in China. During the next decade, coinciding with 
the 10th and 11th Five Year Plans, systemic reforms facilitated the industrialization of Chinese 
culture, and managed the inflow of ‘foreign culture’ and investment in non-sensitive areas 
such as media infrastructure in the wake of WTO accession.  
In 2001, the State Council ratified the term cultural industries following protracted 
debates about ‘cultural security’ (wenhua anquan 文化安全), namely the weakness of 
Chinese culture vis-à-vis foreign competitors (Keane 2013). The primary plan was to 
generate more quantifiable cultural outputs; this resulted in a rapid expansion of physical 
infrastructure – cultural parks, creative precincts, cultural quarters and streets, theme parks, 
and film bases. At the same time, there was some liberalization of expression, especially for 
visual artists. Yet, the cultural industries were fundamentally about material culture, not 
creativity. Culture was reduced to industrial outputs, accounted for in Blue Book (lanpi shu
蓝皮书) reports, which show increasing productivity; for instance, the number of books 
published, the value of paintings sold, the quantity of handicrafts made, the number of films, 
theatre performances, television serials produced and so on.  
Intangibles such as box office takings were harder to measure than the shiploads of 
artefacts and paintings heading towards Hong Kong, the main exit gateway for China’s 
outbound cultural trade. When the government operationalized plans to extend China’s 
‘cultural power’ globally in the mid-2000s, it did this largely through conventional 
government supported channels such as television and radio programmes (CCTV, China 
Radio International), overseas missions (Confucius Institutes), and performing arts troupes, 
as well as by encouraging film makers to make movies that were representative of China. 
‘Going out’ took a number of forms; by the second decade, commercial filmmakers had 
begun to shoot overseas; many looked to coproduce with overseas players, or more 
significantly foreign producers looked for opportunities in China. TV reality shows such as 
Where Are We Going Dad? (Hunan Satellite TV) and Running Man (Zhejiang Satellite TV) 
were made offshore. Incidentally, both of these were formats imported from South Korea. 




Chinese Diaspora, once again showing a ‘reconnection’ with Chinese culture (Keane 2016).  
 Services came of age in the first decade of the new millennium. A key moment was 
the launch of the bit torrent site BTChina in 2003 (Zhao & Keane 2013), which suddenly 
allowed internet users a degree of agency. Services, at least the idea that one was able to 
choose from an expanded buffet of content, thus symbolized an ‘open system’, one that 
interacted dynamically with a wider net environment. The rapid development of user-
generated content (UGC) challenged the hegemony of professional culture makers employed 
in state institutions. Much user-generated content was commercially unusable, once described 
by Tudou’s founder Wang Wei as industrial waste water, a reference to its low quality and 
high consumption of bandwidth (Zhao 2016). Some grassroots content producers made the 
jump into professional content and in doing so contributed to the professionalizing ethos of 
user communities. Original content became king (once again) and amateur content creators 
were given a new lifeline in the form of individual channels (zipindao 自频道 dedicated to 
made-for-web content (Zhao 2016). By the second half of the first decade, leading digital 
platforms in China such as IQiyi, Youku, and LeTV were searching out new content for their 
own platforms; in addition to acquiring overseas rights to popular movies and TV shows they 
sought to invest in home grown movies, television series, and sponsor the production of 
webisodes. 
 Initially, many hesitated to pay for subscription services such as IPTV, video-on-
demand, and streaming. Regulations enacted in 2008 made free downloading illegal, or at 
least more difficult, and forced the digital platforms to compete in an arms race for rights to 
content that could be used on their sites and on-sold to other online sites, including those that 
serviced user communities overseas (Zhao & Keane 2013). Online sites became the prime 
vendors of culture, offering branded products. Even CNTV, the national digital platform 
operated in conjunction with CCTV, began to offer e-commerce and product tie-ins. Culture 
began to move through digital pipelines precipitating the involvement of the household 
economy, namely home-based workers and designers that are sub-contractors for e-
commerce companies like Taobao. The distribution of online cultural products (fashion, 
handicrafts, and designer goods), together with online sales of movie tickets, featured as part 
of Alibaba’s development strategy as it moved into the cultural and content business. 
Tencent’s Wechat platform went global, with users in China sharing links to online videos 
with their family and friends overseas, much in the same way as Facebook and Youtube did, 




users) were faced with more options, more digital choices, and more chances to ‘pull’ the 
content of their choosing. At the same time, commercial interests were engaging in ‘pushing’ 
products. Even if the users were not subscribing they were visiting sites and sharing their 
interests through social media. Data analytics companies moved centre stage. This is a far cry 
from the situation in the late 1980s, when the state media would transmit messages to a mass 
audience on a limited number of media channels, most of which were similar. This is the age 
of abundance. 
 Knowledge suddenly transforms the ecosystem: it becomes a commodity as well as a 
means to engender creativity and monitor intellectual property compliance. Big data analytics 
and the cloud mean that content is stored while user activity is scrutinized and viewing habits 
delivered to advertisers. Second screen viewing apps associated with Alibaba, Tencent, and 
Baidu (IQiyi) offer prizes to viewers who provide more details about themselves and their 
‘friends’. Of course, this is a global phenomenon and many people willingly give over details 
to internet companies without knowing where this information might go (Lee & Andrejevic 
2014). The Chinese cousins of international apps such as Zeebox, Viggle, Miso, and GetGlue 
include Panda TV, Acfun, Bilibili, and CBox, which also function to allow people outside 
China to access and share selected Chinese content. 
However, this is a complex ecosystem in other respects. Not all data is accessible and 
usable. Lugmayr et al. (2016) propose different categories of big data: light, grey, and dark, 
referring to the degree of transparency. Dark data, for instance, includes the dark web, a 
domain of connectivity that evades government control, often harbouring hackers, porn sites, 
and fraudsters. ‘Grey’ data refers to activity that is partly traceable – it is known to exist but 
is relatively ‘unknowable’ (i.e. accessible), whereas ‘light’ data is searchable – and knowable 
– data. The down side is that the Chinese state can also trace the digital activity of almost all 
its citizens, including people living overseas. The well-known Chinese maxim shang you 
zhengce, xia you duice (上有政策，下有对策; ‘on the top there are policies, below there are 
tactics’), which refers to the possibility of evading rules, becomes less operational. In October 
2016, The Washington Post reported on how the Chinese government would soon operate a 
rating system on everyone by using big data, ‘vacuuming’ records from courts, policy, 
banking, tax, and employment, essentially creating digital profiles (Denyer 2016). It goes 
without saying that big internet companies are expected to comply with such surveillance. A 
well-known case, outside of China, is of the US internet company Yahoo supplying 




resident of Beijing, being convicted and jailed for ten years. Returning once more to the new 
oligopoly of BAT – the Three Kingdoms – Baidu maintains close links with the government 
and, consequently, has a poor reputation among many net users in China. Alibaba meanwhile 
has a reputation for fake products, a weakness that conspires to thwart its global ambitions. 
Of the three kingdoms, only Tencent seems to have the confidence of users.      
 
Concluding Remarks: Utopia in the Cloud 
In this final section, we turn to the question posed at the beginning: Can China use the digital 
power of the internet to achieve international recognition as an ‘innovative nation’ or will the 
internet perpetuate a stereotype of China as an authoritarian state and a copycat nation? The 
short answer is that both scenarios are likely to play out.  
 To address the innovative nation conundrum first, the nation is undoubtedly riding on 
a wave of digital utopianism. Utopia is a familiar concept in literature and politics: in the 
language of the Great Proletarian Revolution, communism would release people from their 
hard labour. The current political version called the Chinese Dream promises not a land of 
plenty, but national revitalization; it projects forward to 2049, when China will be a 
superpower and a technological powerhouse. Yang Guobin (2009: 156) writes about the 
utopian impulse among online communities, ‘a critique of the present and a yearning for a 
better world.’  
Currently, the Chinese government identifies three kinds of innovation: original 
innovation, innovation in logistics and supply chains, and secondary innovation (zai 
chuangxin 再创新). The last of these categories is where China plays the hardest, taking ideas 
from the rest of the world and ‘fine-tuning’ them. To achieve ‘original innovation’ requires a 
fundamental change in the way that information is managed and this needs to extend across 
society, not only in free trade zones and selected maker spaces. Meanwhile, China is building 
its own unique capabilities; for instance, Shenzhen’s maker movement has opened up 
linkages to global technology communities, which have the potential to change China’s 
image as a copycat nation (see Lindtner 2015). Massive amounts of money have flooded into 
digital projects since the government’s announcement of Internet+ in March 2015. The 
upside to this is that more researchers and entrepreneurs from places like Silicon Valley are 
returning to China to grab a piece of the action. Many employees at China’s large internet 
companies such as Alibaba speak with American accents. They have returned from Silicon 




The idea that everyone can be an entrepreneur and an innovator, and in doing so 
contribute to building the Chinese Dream, is alluring. Part of the statecraft behind this policy 
is alleviating social tensions among the large demographic sardonically referred to as diaosi 
(屌丝; ‘losers’); for instance, people with computing and IT skills who lack career prospects. 
The utopianism of digital innovation and the dream fantasy that ‘anyone can be an 
entrepreneur’ functions as a pressure release valve. The rapid development of digital hubs, 
and the hype associated with projects, such as the aptly named Dream Town (梦想城镇)in 
Hangzhou (, a place where aspiring start-ups compete to gain admission, is evidence of the 
new national mindset articulated by Internet+. The iconography of Dream Town is a 
composite of the ‘mass entrepreneur’ and the young tech-savvy neophyte, reminiscent of the 
sent-down youth of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, a publicity image promoted by 
Hangzhou’s Dream Town shows a golden field, a field of dreams. Jack Ma’s presence is felt 
in Dream Town: on the wall we find his handprints, first and foremost among a cohort of 
entrepreneurs, many of whom are de facto state officials. This is a dream of a cybernetic 
future in which China will rebalance its economy, become an innovative nation, and achieve 
a measure of global soft power. 
In the next five years, we will surely know more about the potential of the innovative 
nation. The down side is that the Xi Jinping regime is sending out mixed messages. Be 
innovative and make money. Be disruptive but confine this to the marketplace, as 
demonstrated by the competitive activities of BAT. Underpinning this digital development 
blueprint is the fact that a great deal of innovation currently comes from below. Premier Li 
Keqiang is the cheerleader, visiting makerspaces and encouraging young Chinese to retool. 
From the government’s perspective, the primary reason for the interest in the Internet of 
Things, makerspaces, mass entrepreneurship, and innovation hubs is nation building. China 
needs the Internet of Things because connectivity will alleviate many problems, at least that 
is the plan. The IoT can fine tune air conditioners to improve energy consumption. Combined 
with big data it can improve crop yields. The use of sensor networks can help monitor traffic 
congestion. And, of course, it can effectively monitor subversive activities.   
However, the success of Silicon Valley, which the government seeks to emulate, was 
fostered in an environment that celebrates individualism and neoliberal values. How this will 
play out in China in the future remains unclear. The rapid breakout of incubators, innovation 
hubs, and Silicon Valley style projects raises questions about the government’s ability to 




became real estate projects (see Keane 2011). Moreover, the massive investment in cloud 
computing is a mixed blessing. Big data in the hands of the right people, for instance 
scientists, medical practitioners, is valuable. In the hands of government authorities it 
increases the risk of surveillance.  
 The implications for Chinese culture going global via its digital champions is less 
clear. Will China’s digital missionaries succeed beyond the Mainland? Currently, the success 
of Chinese online platforms provides overseas Chinese with a connection to their home 
culture. But this is an ethnocentric model of ‘going out’: that is, consumers are already 
culturally familiar with the content, with the product, and with the messages. The positive 
side for the government is that these online platforms are connecting many 2nd generation 
Chinese, for instance the sons and daughters of migrants. Overseas Chinese are consuming 
content and sharing this on Wechat. However, in order for China to achieve real cultural 
power, Chinese media needs to engage with poly-ethnic communities and audiences; that is, 
the unconverted ‘non-Chinese’. Taking Chinese culture to the foreigner (waiguo ren 外国人) 
is more difficult. In this regard, China’s digital champions are probably better placed than 
China Central Television or its cousin China Network Television; they are currently buying 
up knowledge assets, brands, and customer data bases gaining know-how that will assist in 
cracking the world market. Companies like Alibaba, Wanda, Tencent, and LeEco are seeking 
to learn from international competitors by forming business alliances.  
At the same time, even these frontrunners have to overcome global perceptions of 
China as an imitative nation (Yang 2016), of an authoritarian regime that has, and continues 
to suppress expression. As Shambaugh argues, this illustrates a weakened version of soft 
power, reflective of a ‘partial power,’ not yet a great power (da guo 大国).   
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